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HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Yet, research also shows that learning is typically highly specific 
(Salomon and Perkins, 1989; Kramer and Willis, 2003; Green and 
Bavelier, 2008; Roelfsema et al., 2010). While individuals trained on 
a task will improve on that very task, other tasks, even very similar 
ones, often show little or no improvement. For example, in visual 
learning tasks, improvements are often not observed if the untrained 
test stimulus has a different orientation or contrast than the trained 
stimulus (Roelfsema et al., 2010). Similarly, memory training often 
enhances memory for the trained content, but not memory skills 
themselves. In the example of the taxi drivers, follow-up research 
showed that the taxi drivers did not exhibit improved perform-
ance on other memory tasks (Woollett and Maguire, 2009). Thus, 
training benefits are often stimulus or content specific rather than 
process specific, a fact that is well documented in the perceptual 
(Roelfsema et al., 2010), cognitive (Kramer and Willis, 2003), and 
motor (Bachman, 1961) domain. This is obviously a potentially 
severe impediment for training programs in educational or clini-
cal settings, where the goal is to improve performance in everyday 
life and which thus necessarily require a general improvement 
in skills.
The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to examine the hypothesis 
that systematic mental training can induce process-specific learn-
ing, that is, learning that generalizes to novel stimuli and task 
contexts, and (ii) to identify aspects of training contexts that may 
contribute to process-specific learning from the vantage point of 
mental training. If plasticity is indeed the obligatory consequence 
of not only each sensory input or motor act, but also of each 
thought process, changes in brain circuitry due to mental training 
INTRODUCTION
The ability to learn is a function of brain plasticity and essential to 
the survival of all animals. Humans appear remarkable in this respect, 
as they can acquire a wide range of skills given appropriate training. 
Neuroscience research within the last few decades confirms that the 
human brain is plastic, and much more so than once thought possible 
(Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998). One of the most salient find-
ings is perhaps the observation that the adult brain can still change 
significantly in both structure and function as a result of experience 
(e.g., Maguire et al., 2000; Draganski et al., 2004; Boyke et al., 2008). 
For example, taxi drivers, who obtain extensive navigational experi-
ence as adults, have larger posterior hippocampi, a brain structure 
important for spatial representation of the environment (Maguire 
et al., 2000). Not only long-term expertise, but also relatively short 
practice has been associated with neural changes in adults. For exam-
ple, performing a five-finger piano exercise for 2 h on five consecutive 
days resulted in an enlargement of primary motor areas representing 
the finger muscles, which was accompanied by improved perform-
ance (Pascual-Leone et al., 1995, 2005). Remarkably, this study also 
showed that mental practice of the same finger exercise resulted in a 
similar reorganization of the motor cortex to the one observed in the 
group of participants that physically practiced the movements. Thus, 
plasticity appears to be an intrinsic property of the nervous system 
retained throughout a lifespan and the obligatory consequence of 
all neural activity, including mental practice. Indeed, it is now com-
monly held that the brain undergoes continuous changes in response 
to each sensory input, motor act, association, reward signal, action 
plan, and awareness itself (Pascual-Leone et al., 2005).
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“process-specific learning” to denote learning effects that do not 
only improve performance on the trained task or tasks, but also 
transfer to new tasks and domains (cf. Green and Bavelier, 2008), 
i.e., learning that is not specific to the trained stimuli or tasks. 
The main focus of the paper will be on effects of mental train-
ing of cognitive control processes. “Cognitive control” refers to a 
collection of processes that allow us flexibly adapt our behavior 
in the pursuit of an internal goal, and includes processes such as 
selection of goal-relevant information, performance monitor-
ing, interference resolution, and storage and manipulation of 
information in working memory. These processes are generally 
considered to be largely independent from one another, because 
they are differentially affected by independent variables, and can 
be behaviorally and neurally dissociated. There is an emerging 
consensus in the literature that this conglomerate of largely inde-
pendent, but constantly interacting control processes is domain 
general (e.g., Baddeley, 1996; Fuster, 1997; Smith and Jonides, 
1999; Miyake et al., 2000). Specifically, the general proposal is that 
the engagement of a particular cognitive control process (e.g., 
performance monitoring) within any one cognitive task is simply 
a matter of the degree to which load is exercised on that control 
mechanism and should extend to any cognitive challenge that 
incorporates sufficient control requirements of the same kind. 
The focus of this paper on the amenability of cognitive control 
processes to training is thus especially valuable because these 
abilities are fundamental to higher cognition and contribute to 
performance across cognitive domains (e.g., attention, working 
memory, long-term memory; Smith and Jonides, 1999; Duncan 
and Owen, 2000).
This paper will focus in particular on mental training of cog-
nitive control processes as cultivated by meditation. Little is cur-
rently known about the amenability of cognitive control processes 
to mental training. Most studies to date have focused on mental 
training in the motor domain (for recent reviews, see, e.g., Guillot 
and Collet, 2005; Munzert et al., 2009). This is likely related to the 
fact that it is difficult to design controlled mental training contexts 
in which an individual can consistently practice a specific cognitive 
control skill. Yet, being able to enhance cognitive control function 
through training is especially valuable since, as mentioned above, 
cognitive control skills, such as the ability to focus attention in 
face of distraction, contribute to performance on virtually any task 
(Smith and Jonides, 1999; Duncan and Owen, 2000). Notably, many 
meditation practices are based on precisely descriptive and highly 
detailed theories (Gyatso and Jinpa, 1995; Gunaratana, 2007) and 
are explicitly designed to train such core cognitive skills, and typi-
cally in the absence of performing some external task (Lutz et al., 
2007, 2008). Furthermore, many of these practices include a focus 
on maintaining optimal levels of arousal and motivation, and 
ascending stages through which the practitioner passes, ensuring 
continuously challenging training conditions. These are all factors 
that may foster more general learning (e.g., Green and Bavelier, 
2008), as will be discussed in more detail below. The neuroscientific 
study of meditation may thus provide important insights into the 
potential of mental training to strengthen cognitive control skills, 
and the factors that contribute to, and the mechanisms that underlie 
process-specific learning.
The paper is organized as follows. First, to demonstrate the ability 
of purely mental training to influence brain function and structure, 
and thereby, behavior, we will briefly review findings from studies of 
mental practice in the motor domain. We will then focus on mental 
training in the cognitive domain. To this end, we will introduce 
standard cognitive-based meditation practices, and discuss recent 
key findings to illustrate the usefulness of mental training as culti-
vated by these meditation practices in the neuroscientific study of 
brain and cognitive plasticity. Next, we will review characteristics of 
mental training contexts that may promote process-related learning 
from the vantage point of meditation. In this context, we will also 
discuss recent findings from studies using other complex training 
protocols in non-laboratory settings, such as action video gaming, 
that have reported learning that appears more general than once 
thought possible. Then, we will discuss methodological challenges 
that the neuroscientific study of meditation faces in particular. The 
paper will end with a discussion in which important avenues for 
future meditation research are identified.
MENTAL TRAINING IN THE MOTOR DOMAIN
Research has convincingly shown that mental training using motor 
imagery, like physical practice, can produce changes in brain struc-
ture and function that are associated with improved subsequent 
performance of a motor skill (Guillot and Collet, 2005; Munzert 
et al., 2009). In a seminal study, mentioned above, Pascual-Leone 
et al. (1995) showed that mental practice alone is sufficient to pro-
mote the modulation of neural circuits involved in the early stages 
of motor skill learning. Two hours of mental practice of a finger 
tapping sequence on five separate days was associated with both 
an enlargement of the representations of the fingers in primary 
motor cortex, as well as improved motor performance. In another 
study, Ranganathan et al. (2004) found that strength gains follow-
ing mental training were related to increases in the amplitude of 
scalp-recorded brain potentials over midline and lateral motor and 
midline frontal regions. They proposed that mental training may 
have affected higher-order motor cortical regions, such as sup-
plementary motor and prefrontal regions, which may in turn have 
influenced primary motor areas. A recent study using the high 
spatial resolution of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
confirmed that gains in motor behavior after mental training are 
associated with changes in higher-order motor cortical regions 
(Nyberg et al., 2006). Mental training-related changes in neural 
activity were observed in the supplementary motor area, as well as in 
visual cortex. Thus, mental practice of a motor act has been shown 
to produce changes in brain function and improve performance. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, mental practice has long found wide 
acceptance in the training of athletes (e.g., Suinn, 1984).
An important question is how mental training using motor 
imagery may improve motor performance (Jeannerod, 1996). 
Behavioral studies have shown that there is a strong correlation 
between imagined and executed actions along various behavioral 
dimensions, suggesting that mental and physical training rely in 
part on common mechanisms (Jeannerod, 1994; Grush, 2004). 
For example, the time it takes to imagine an action is closely cor-
related with the execution time of the action (Decety et al., 1989). 
In line with the idea that the contents of the representations that 
are formed and strengthened through the two types of practice 
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trol skills. The neuroscientific study of meditation may thus provide 
important insights into the usefulness of mental training as a tool 
in the study of brain and cognitive plasticity (see also Tang and 
Posner, 2009; Xiong and Doraiswamy, 2009).
Despite a large number of scientific reports and theoretical pro-
posals, the neurophysiological processes involved in meditation 
and the long-term impact of meditation on the brain and cognitive 
function are still largely unknown. The lack of statistical evidence, 
control populations and tasks, and the heterogeneity of the studied 
meditative states can, in part, account for the limited contributions 
made by neuroscience-oriented research on meditation. Therefore, 
rather than providing an exhaustive review of this literature, we will 
only discuss recent key findings that speak to the idea that mental 
training of cognitive skills can induce process-specific learning. 
Other articles have recently reviewed this literature more exhaus-
tively (see, e.g., Cahn and Polich, 2006; Lutz et al., 2007). Specifically, 
in the below, we will first define meditation, and review recent key 
findings from neuroimaging studies of meditation. Modern neu-
roimaging techniques provide a new possibility for understanding 
process-specific learning by revealing its underlying mechanisms. 
We will then identify aspects of mental training as cultivated by 
meditation that may foster process-specific learning.
MEDITATION
The term “meditation” refers to a broad variety of practices, rang-
ing from techniques designed to promote relaxation or improve 
attentional function to exercises performed with more far-reaching 
goals such as a heightened sense of well-being or the cultivation of 
altruistic behaviors. Not all practices thus focus on explicit training 
of specific cognitive skills, and it is therefore essential to be specific 
about the type of meditation practice under investigation. Here we 
focus on two common styles of Buddhist contemplative techniques, 
because (1) Buddhist traditions offer extensive, precisely descriptive 
and highly detailed theories about these practices in a manner that 
lends itself readily to appropriation into a neuroscientific context 
(Gyatso and Jinpa, 1995; Gunaratana, 2007; Lutz et al., 2007), and 
(2) these techniques are now being applied in clinical settings (e.g., 
Kabat-Zinn et al., 2000; Teasdale et al., 2000). These two meditation 
styles are often combined, whether in a single session or over the 
course of practitioner’s training, and are explicitly designed to train 
specific cognitive processes. The first style, focused attention (FA) 
meditation, entails voluntary focusing attention on a chosen object 
in a sustained fashion, such as a visual object, a visualized image, or 
breath sensations (Lutz et al., 2007, 2008). To sustain this focus, the 
practitioner must also constantly monitor and regulate the qual-
ity of attention. Thus, FA meditation is thought to not only train 
one’s ability to sustain attention, but also to develop three regula-
tory skills; the first is the monitoring faculty that remains vigilant 
to distractions without destabilizing the intended focus. The next 
skill is the ability to disengage from a distracting object without 
further involvement. The last involves the ability to redirect focus 
promptly to the chosen object. One may note remarkable paral-
lels between the processes involved in FA meditation, as described 
above, and recent cognitive (neuro)science conceptualizations of 
attention. Western scientists also recognize that the ability to focus 
and sustain attention on an intended object requires skills involved 
overlap to some extent, neuroimaging research has shown that 
motor imagery and motor execution activate similar, although 
not identical, neural networks (e.g., Jeannerod, 1995; Decety, 
1996; Lotze et al., 1999; Kosslyn et al., 2007; Munzert et al., 2009). 
Yet, there are important differences between mental and physical 
practice. Mental training using motor imagery heavily depends 
on cognitive aspects of action control, such as motor planning, as 
well as on working memory to transform, maintain, and inspect 
information about a motor act. In addition, in contrast to physical 
practice, although a motor plan is generated, it is prevented from 
operating on the body (Jeannerod, 1994; Grush, 2004). These dif-
ferences between mental and motor training are substantiated by 
neuroimaging research showing that mental and motor training 
can affect distinct neural networks (Lacourse et al., 2005; Nyberg 
et al., 2006; Olsson et al., 2008).
It has been proposed that mental training may be more likely 
to develop and strengthen effector-independent representations, 
rather than effector-dependent representations, whereas for physi-
cal practice, the reverse may be true (Olsson et al., 2008). It is 
notable in this respect that several studies have reported benefits 
of mental training using motor imagery on tasks that are largely 
cognitive (Minas, 1978; Driskell et al., 1994). Of further importance, 
in some studies, mental practice (Wohldmann et al., 2008), as well as 
combined mental and motor practice (Olsson et al., 2008) has been 
associated with greater transfer of learning than physical practice, 
that is, better performance on novel tasks that call upon the trained 
skill. These data support the idea that mental practice using motor 
imagery may strengthen more abstract representations that do not 
involve specific effectors, thereby fostering process-specific learning 
that more easily generalizes across stimuli and tasks. Initial evidence 
for this idea comes from an fMRI study by Olsson et al. (2008), 
who showed facilitated transfer of learning after combined motor 
and mental training that was related to changes in the connections 
from both motor and cognitive systems to the cerebellum.
To conclude, mental training of motor skills leads to changes 
in brain circuitry and behavior, just as physical training produces 
changes in brain circuitry and behavior. Yet, the mechanisms under-
lying mental and physical training of motor skills are not identi-
cal. Notably, mental training may improve motor performance by 
strengthening more abstract representations, and thereby promote 
transfer of learning to novel task contexts.
MENTAL TRAINING IN THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN
We will now turn to mental training that is specifically focused 
at enhancing cognitive function rather than at improving motor 
performance. Just like processes related to motor control, processes 
related to the control of cognitive processes should be amendable to 
mental training. As mentioned in the introduction, we focus here 
on cognitive control processes, as their amenability to training is 
especially valuable because these abilities are fundamental to higher 
cognition and contribute to performance across a wide range of 
cognitively demanding tasks (Smith and Jonides, 1999; Duncan and 
Owen, 2000). Yet, unfortunately, relatively little is known about the 
amenability of such processes to mental training. As mentioned 
above, this is likely due to the fact that it is difficult to design control-
led mental training contexts. Notably, many meditation   practices 
are based on precisely descriptive and highly detailed theories and 
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tantly, neuroimaging work suggests that FA and OM meditation 
may not only during meditation activate brain regions involved in 
the psychological processes that are allegedly evoked, but may also 
produce lasting changes in brain and mental function that translate 
to improved performance in novel task contexts. For instance, sev-
eral recent studies of FA meditation have reported improvements 
in sustained voluntary attention during performance of external 
tasks that do not require meditation. In one longitudinal study, in 
which participants were randomly assigned to a meditation-retreat 
group or a waiting-list control group, 5 h/day of meditation practice 
that involved voluntary focusing attention on a chosen object in 
a sustained fashion for 3 months was found to improve sustained 
visual attention (MacLean et al., 2010). Specifically, compared to 
the waiting-list control group, meditation-retreat participants 
showed enhanced perceptual discrimination and vigilance on a 
sustained visual attention task requiring participants to discrimi-
nate a rare threshold-level short line from a standard long line. 
Notably, these enhancements in sustained attention ability were still 
observed 3 months after the retreat ended, demonstrating endur-
ing changes in sustained attention. In another recent longitudinal 
study, Lutz et al. (2009) found that 3 months of intensive FA and 
OM meditation was associated with enhanced moment-to-moment 
stability of attention during FA meditation, as measured both by 
reduced response time variability to rare target events in an audi-
tory sustained attention task (Figure 1A) and increased trial-to-
trial consistency of oscillatory neural responses over frontal scalp 
regions to these events as recorded with electroencephalography 
(EEG; Figure 1B). Furthermore, those individuals who showed 
the greatest training-induced increase in neural response consist-
ency showed the largest decrease in behavioral response variability 
(Figure 1C). In addition, this study reported that intense men-
tal training affected cortical engagement, as reflected by a con-
comitant reduction in event-related desynchronization (ERD) to 
target tones (Figure 1D). ERD is usually viewed as a correlate of 
increased cellular excitability in thalamocortical systems during 
cortical information processing (Pfurtscheller and da Silva, 1999). 
Within this framework, previous studies have interpreted reduc-
tions in ERD after practice of external tasks as decreased cognitive 
effort (Pfurtscheller and da Silva, 1999; Romero et al., 2008). A 
mental training-related reduction in task effort would be consistent 
with traditional accounts of progress in this practice (Gyatso and 
Jinpa, 1995; Gunaratana, 2007). In these accounts, the regulative 
attentional skills allegedly are invoked less and less frequently with 
more advanced level of training, and the ability to sustain focus is 
said to become progressively “effortless.” Since these effects were 
observed over time within the same individual and during external 
task performance, together the above findings suggest that purely 
mental training of FA generalizes to improvements in performance 
on novel tasks that call upon the trained skills. These longitudinal 
findings also indicate that the enhanced sustained attention ability 
most likely reflects plasticity in the adult brain, and more generally, 
that attentional skills are subject to training.
Long-term practice of OM meditation is also thought to result 
in enduring changes in cognitive and brain function. Specifically, 
because OM meditation fosters non-reactive awareness of the 
stream of experience without deliberate selection of a primary 
in monitoring the focus of attention and detecting distraction, dis-
engaging attention from the source of distraction, and (re)directing 
and engaging attention to the intended object (e.g., Posner and 
Petersen, 1990).
The second style of meditation, open monitoring (OM) medita-
tion, involves non-reactively monitoring the content of experience 
from moment-to-moment, without focusing on any explicit object 
(Lutz et al., 2007, 2008). OM meditation typically starts by calm-
ing the mind and reducing distractions using FA meditation. The 
practitioner then gradually reduces the focus on an explicit object 
in FA, and the monitoring faculty is correspondingly emphasized. 
Usually, there is also an increasing emphasis on cultivating a “reflex-
ive” awareness that grants one greater access to the rich features of 
each experience, such as the degree of phenomenal intensity, the 
emotional tone, and the active cognitive schema. OM meditation 
is thought to enhance non-reactive meta-cognitive monitoring, as 
well as increase awareness of automatic cognitive and emotional 
interpretations of sensory, perceptual, and endogenous stimuli, and 
thereby cognitive flexibility and reappraisal (Bishop et al., 2004; 
Lutz et al., 2008; Chambers et al., 2009).
Both FA and OM meditation are assumed to induce a predict-
able and distinctive state (or set of states) whose occurrence is 
clearly indicated by certain cognitive and emotional features. These 
states, which arise during practice and are relatively short-term, can 
allegedly result in enduring changes in mental function, i.e., in the 
development of certain traits (Lutz et al., 2007, 2008). For example, 
FA meditation is said to develop, as one advances, the three regula-
tive skills to the point that, for example, advanced practitioners have 
an especially acute ability to notice when the mind has wandered. 
Eventually, this induces a trait change, whereby the attention rests 
more readily and stably on the chosen focus. At the most advanced 
levels, the regulative skills are invoked less and less frequently, and 
the ability to sustain focus thus becomes progressively “effortless.” 
It should be noted that this explicit focus on inducing a particular 
state of mind (or set of mental states) comprises an important 
difference between meditation practices, like FA and OM, and com-
puterized task training of cognitive function. While computerized 
task training might also lead to changes in mental state (e.g., being 
focused), this is typically not its primary aim. To summarize, FA and 
OM practices are designed to train specific mental processes and 
such changes are thought to gradually endure through time, i.e., 
result in process-specific learning and the development of traits.
NEUROIMAGING sTUDIEs Of MEDITATION
Although the systematic study of meditation is still in its infancy, 
recent findings suggest that experience in FA and OM meditation 
is associated with changes in brain and cognitive function both 
during meditation and during performance of external tasks that 
do not require meditation (Cahn and Polich, 2006; Lutz et al., 2007, 
2008; Chambers et al., 2009). Neuroimaging studies examining the 
neural correlates of meditation indicate that task demands of the 
two meditation styles are reflected in characteristic neural activity 
patterns. For example, a recent cross-sectional study found that FA 
meditation on an external visual point compared to a rest condition 
was associated with greater activation in multiple brain regions, 
implicated in attentional processing, including the superior frontal 
sulcus and the intraparietal sulcus, in long-term meditation experts 
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tion, including the anterior insula and the somatosensory cortex, 
during a monitoring state relative to a narrative generation state 
in participants who were randomly assigned to an 8-week course 
incorporating OM meditation compared with a group of waitlist 
controls (Farb et al., 2007).
Next to these functional changes, several studies have also 
reported structural changes in the brain of long-term FA and OM 
meditators compared to novices in regions that are typically acti-
vated during these meditations (Lazar et al., 2005; Hölzel et al., 
2008; Grant et al., 2010). For example, a study by Hölzel et al. (2008) 
found greater gray matter concentration in the anterior insula, 
a brain region, as mentioned above, important for awareness of 
internal experience, in experienced Vipassana meditators (mean 
practice: 8.6 years; 2 h daily). In another study, more than 1000 h 
of Zen meditation was associated with increased cortical thickness 
in the dorsal anterior cingulate, a region important in the adaptive 
control of behavior, and bilaterally, in the secondary somatosensory 
cortex. It is important that these cross-sectional findings are sup-
plemented by findings from prospective studies to show that these 
structural changes result from meditation rather than, e.g., pre-
existing individual differences. In addition, because both Vipassana 
and Zen meditation include forms of FA and OM meditation, future 
studies are necessary to determine how FA and OM meditation may 
each contribute to these anatomical changes.
object, intensive practice can be expected to reduce the elaborative 
thinking that would be stimulated by evaluating or interpreting 
a selected object (Cohen et al., 1996; Lutz et al., 2007, 2008). 
In line with this idea, Slagter et al. (2007, 2009) recently found 
that 3 months of intensive OM meditation reduced elaborative 
processing of the first of two target stimuli (T1 and T2) pre-
sented in a rapid stream of distracters, as indicated by a smaller 
T1-elicited P3b, a brain potential index of resource allocation 
(Figure 2A). Moreover, this reduction in resource allocation to 
T1 left neural resources more rapidly available for T2, as indexed 
by an increase in trial-to-trial phase consistency of neural oscil-
latory activity in the theta frequency range (Figure 2B), and was 
associated with improved detection of T2 when it followed T1 
within half a second (Figure 2C). Because participants were not 
engaged in formal meditation during task performance in this 
study, these results provide support for the idea that one effect of 
an intensive training in OM meditation might be a general reduc-
tion in the propensity to “get stuck” on a target, as reflected in less 
elaborate stimulus processing, and the development of efficient 
mechanisms to engage and then disengage from target stimuli 
in response to task demands. OM meditation is also thought 
to cultivate a reflexive awareness of the subjective features of a 
given moment, such as its emotional tone, by engaging processes 
involved in interoception or awareness of bodily responses (Lutz 
et al., 2008). In line with this idea, a recent fMRI study found 
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Figure 1 | effects of FA meditation. (A) Intensive mental training reduced 
intra-individual variability of behavioral performance. Average SD of reaction 
time in response to target (attended deviant) tones, separately for each session 
(time 1, time 2) and group [practitioners (Pract), novices (Nov)]. (B) Intensive 
mental training increased trial-to-trial consistency of brain responses to 
attended deviant tones. The scalp maps show the spatial distribution of the 
mental training-related increase in theta-band (4–7 Hz) phase consistency 
(indexed by normalized PLF) to target tones, as indexed by a three-way 
interaction between group, session, and condition (attended, unattended 
deviant tones). F values are averaged between 300 and 500 ms. The time 
course of normalized PLF values averaged across the electrodes sites showing 
this significant three-way interaction is shown separately for each group, 
session, and attended (Att) and unattended (Unatt) deviant tones. Note that the 
observed increase in phase consistency to attended deviant tones over time 
was only observed for the practitioner group. (C) The correlation plot shows 
that the observed change in the trial-to-trial variability of brain responses 
predicted the observed behavioral change in the trial-to-trial variability of the RT. 
(D) Mental training selectively reduced cognitive effort as indexed by ERD. Time 
course of the ERD for attended and unattended deviant tones (Dev.) shown for 
the practitioners and novices separately. The scalp maps show the spatial 
distribution of the mental training-related decrease in beta-band (13–30 Hz) 
ERD to attended vs. unattended deviant tones [three-way interaction between 
group, session, and condition]. F values are averaged between 580 and 
750 ms. Figure is adopted from Lutz et al. (2009).from the vantage point of mental training as cultivated by medita-
tion. It should be noted that these factors are not specific to medita-
tion training contexts, and likely represent common determinates 
of more generalized learning (e.g., Schmidt and Bjork, 1992; Ahissar 
and Hochstein, 2004; Green and Bavelier, 2008; Ahissar et al., 2009). 
Other non-laboratory training settings that appear to produce more 
general learning, such as action video gaming and musical training, 
also embody many of these characteristics (see Green and Bavelier, 
2008 for an extensive review).
 COMpLExITy Of THE TRAINING CONTExT
From the above descriptions of FA and OM meditation, it is clear 
that each of these practices taps several cognitive skills in parallel. 
For example, FA meditation involves processes involved in directing 
and sustaining attention on a selected object (e.g., breath sensa-
tion), detecting mind wandering and distractors (e.g., thoughts), 
and disengagement of attention from distractors and shifting of 
attention back to the selected object. This is a key difference between 
mental training as cultivated by meditation and typical laboratory 
training settings that generally have been designed to train one spe-
cific cognitive skill, but not others. Like-wise, action video gaming, 
which has been shown to promote process-specific learning (e.g., 
Green and Bavelier, 2003, 2006; Donohue et al., 2010), naturally 
taps into many processes in parallel (Green and Bavelier, 2008). 
To summarize, mental training of cognitive skills as cultivated by 
FA and OM meditation has been associated with changes in brain 
structure and function, as well as improved task performance. These 
findings provide initial support for the idea that systematic mental 
training of cognitive skills, as cultivated by meditation, can improve 
performance on external tasks that call upon the trained skills, and 
hence can strengthen specific cognitive processes. These findings 
also add to a growing body of literature demonstrating plasticity 
in the adult brain, and may provide initial insights into the basic 
mechanisms that underlie cognitive process-specific learning.
fACTORs THAT DETERMINE pROCEss-spECIfIC LEARNING
A long-standing issue in cognitive training is how to get training 
benefits to generalize to different stimuli and tasks (e.g., Schmidt 
and Bjork, 1992; Kramer and Willis, 2003; Green and Bavelier, 2008). 
As mentioned above, transfer of learning to novel task contexts has 
generally been the exception rather than the rule. Yet, purely mental 
training, as cultivated by meditation, as discussed above, appears 
to improve performance on novel, external tasks that call upon 
the trained skills but do not require meditation, and hence, induce 
process-specific learning. An important question is therefore what 
aspects of the meditation context may promote process-specific 
learning. In the below, we will discuss several factors that appear 
particularly important determinants of process-specific learning 
Figure 2 | effects of OM meditation. (A) Brain potentials from electrode Pz, 
time-locked to T1 onset in short-interval trials as a function of session (time 2 vs. 
1), T2 accuracy (no-blink vs. blink), and group (practitioners vs. novices). This figure 
panel illustrates that intensive OM meditation was associated with a selective 
reduction in T1-elicited P3b amplitude, a brain potential index of resource 
allocation, in no-blink trials in the practitioner group. The scalp map shows 
electrode sites where this three-way interaction between session, T2 accuracy, 
and group was significant between 420 and 440 ms. Adopted from Slagter et al. 
(2007); (B) Target locking of the theta frequency band phase at electrodes Fz and 
FT8, time-locked to T1 onset, shown for short-interval no-blink trials and separately 
for each session and group. Neural activity in the theta frequency band 
phase-locked robustly to consciously perceived target stimuli over frontal scalp 
regions. Importantly, a significant meditation-related increase in T2 phase 
consistency was observed over midline frontal and right lateral frontal and 
centro-parietal scalp regions (see scalp map). This increase in phase consistency 
over time was only observed for the practitioner group, indicating that intensive 
OM meditation may have reduced trial-to-trial variability in the recruitment of 
processes leading toward the conscious perception of T2. Adopted from Slagter 
et al. (2009); (C) Relationship between the observed change in brain resource 
allocation to T1, as indexed by T1-elicited P3b amplitude (for no-blink trials), and the 
corresponding the change in attentional blink magnitude over time. Note that 
those individuals that showed the largest decrease in T1-elicited P3b amplitude 
over time generally showed the largest increase in T2 accuracy over time. Adopted 
from Slagter et al. (2007); together, these data support the notion that the ability to 
accurately identify T2 depends upon the efficient processing of T1, and that OM 
meditation may reduce elaborate object processing.
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may provide another factor that fosters process-specific learning 
in meditation.
 TAsk DIffICULTy
Learning is more likely to occur when the task remains challeng-
ing, albeit not too difficult, throughout the training (Ahissar and 
Hochstein, 2004). This is the case for example, in action video 
gaming, where the player advances from one level of difficulty to 
the next as expertise develops (Green and Bavelier, 2008). This is 
also true for meditation, where a practitioner is gradually intro-
duced to more refined aspects of a technique while he or she gains 
more and more familiarity with the practice. Indeed, many con-
templative traditions speak of ascending stages through which the 
practitioner passes, and a single practice may progress gradually 
through a number of meditative states, that might significantly 
differ from each other both phenomenally and in terms of the 
appropriate technique to be applied (Lutz et al., 2007). This pro-
gression ensures that the practice remains engaging and may also 
contribute to process-specific learning.
 AROUsAL AND MOTIVATION
Arousal and motivation are important principles guiding learning. 
It is well known that training paradigms that lead to low levels 
of arousal will tend to lead to low amounts of learning, as will 
training paradigms that lead to excessively high levels of arousal 
(Frankenhaeuser and Gardell, 1976). Between these extremes is 
some level of arousal that leads to a maximum amount of learning 
(Green and Bavelier, 2008). Notably, central to both FA and OM 
meditation is maintenance of an optimal level of arousal or alert-
ness via the regulation of attention or emotions (Lutz et al., 2007). 
For example, in most styles of FA meditation, after having placed the 
attention on the object, the practitioner seeks to avoid two overall 
“flaws” that represent under- and over-arousal. The first, dullness, 
is detected, in its most gross form, as a sensation of drowsiness. 
The second, excitement, manifests itself in distraction or atten-
tion wandering to other mental events. When suboptimal levels 
of arousal are detected, the practitioner can apply counteracting 
methods. For instance, to counteract drowsiness, the practitioner 
may add intensity to a visualized object or tension to the body. 
There are a variety of findings in the literature that already suggests 
that autonomic changes occur during FA and OM meditations. 
A frequent finding is a decrease in arousal during these practices 
(Cahn and Polich, 2006; Lutz et al., 2007). For instance, Takahashi 
et al. (2005) in a study of Zen meditation found changes in heart 
rate variability (reflecting parasympathetic nervous system activ-
ity) that were associated with changes in specific EEG oscillatory 
activity patterns. Yet, little is still known on the effect of FA and OM 
meditations on the maintenance of an optimal balance between 
excitement and dullness.
Like actively monitoring and regulating arousal levels, motiva-
tion is an inherent feature of many meditation practices. A for-
mal meditation session will often begin and end with deliberately 
invocating some forms of soteriological or altruistic motivations 
(Gyatso and Jinpa, 1995; Gunaratana, 2007). Such deliberate 
practice, typically on a daily basis, is known to be a critical factor 
for the continued improvement of performance (Ericsson, 1996; 
Many action video games require players to simultaneously focus 
attention on task-relevant information, while ignoring distracting 
events, to monitor the environment and performance, and to track 
multiple moving objects. Thus, the complexity of training setting 
may be an important determinant of process-specific learning.
sTIMULUs AND TAsk VARIAbILITy
Another important determinant of process-specific learning appears 
to be variability of input and task (Schmidt and Bjork, 1992). High 
variability at the level of the exemplars or movements to be learned, 
and the context in which they occur likely prevents learning at the 
level of specific stimuli/effectors, or stimulus-  response relation-
ships, thereby fostering learning at a higher or more abstract level 
of representation (Seidler, 2004; Green and Bavelier, 2008). It is 
notable in this respect that the observed structural brain changes 
in taxi drivers have not been observed in bus drivers, who operate 
along a constraint set of routes, unlike taxi drivers, who navigate 
widely around the city (Maguire et al., 2006). Of further impor-
tance, although many studies have reported lack of transfer of 
training benefits to new task contexts, recent studies of external 
task training in laboratory settings have reported improvements 
in cognitive task performance and transfer of learning to novel 
cognitive tasks when the training used a battery of tasks that all 
called upon the same (to-be-trained) cognitive skill, but involved 
different stimuli and task contexts (Olesen et al., 2004; Dahlin et al., 
2008; Jaeggi et al., 2008; Persson and Reuter-Lorenz, 2008). For 
example, Dahlin et al. (2008) used six different training tasks, which 
all required working memory updating, a basic cognitive control 
skill. Five weeks of training resulted in enhanced performance not 
only on the trained task, but importantly also on a novel task, which 
required updating, but differed in terms of memorial content, set 
size, presentation rate, and response format. This transfer effect was 
mediated by the striatum, a subcortical brain structure important 
for updating. Thus, variability of input and task appears to be an 
important determinant of process-related learning and therefore, 
whether or not transfer of learning will occur. Mental training 
as cultivated by FA and OM meditation naturally includes many 
stimuli of various type and domain (e.g., auditory/somatosensory, 
cognitive/emotional, internal/external) that occur in different men-
tal contexts. For example, OM meditation consists in being attentive 
moment by moment to anything that occurs in experience, whether 
it be a sensation, thought, or feeling. Such variability in stimulus 
and mental content may contribute to process-specific learning as 
a function of meditation.
TypEs Of pROCEssEs TRAINED
It has been proposed that cognitive learning is most likely to occur 
when training programs focus on strengthening cognitive control 
functions that orchestrate thoughts and actions to make them con-
sistent with internal goals (Persson and Reuter-Lorenz, 2008). As 
mentioned above, these include processes such as focusing atten-
tion, meta-cognitive monitoring, and switching between tasks. 
These processes are shared by many tasks and are widely viewed 
as amodal (Smith and Jonides, 1999; Duncan and Owen, 2000). 
Benefits of training programs focusing on such core cognitive skills 
may therefore more easily extend across materials and stimulus 
modalities, and hence, across tasks. Notably, FA and OM meditation 
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perienced meditators, and the fact that it is impossible to blind 
participants to the nature of the study (in this case, meditation). 
Researchers should therefore be sensitive to potential confound-
ing effects of motivation, demand characteristics, and outcome 
expectations on study outcomes. For example, participants with 
an interest or belief in meditation may be more likely to consent 
to participate and more motivated to follow the study procedure. 
They may also more strongly believe in positive study outcomes. 
It is well known that such non-specific factors can significantly 
influence study outcomes (e.g., Baskin et al., 2003).
One way to deal with these issues is to choose a control group 
with a clear conception of the research question and the hypoth-
esized mechanism, and thorough consideration of how threats to 
validity may be best addressed for a given, clearly defined training 
procedure. For instance, a study may benefit from using an active 
control group that receives a structurally comparable, but differ-
ent treatment than the meditation group, for example a physical 
exercise program (e.g., MacCoon et al., 2011). An active control 
group controls not only for factors related to the fact that partici-
pants cannot be blinded to the meditation intervention, such as 
expectancy effects, but also for other non-specific factors, such as 
social interactions, attention given by instructors, and time spend 
in the study. In studies of meditation to date, including most of the 
studies reviewed in this article, active control groups have been very 
rarely used. If we ultimately wish to attribute the changes observed 
in studies of meditation-based interventions to the active ingredi-
ent of meditation per se rather than the many non-specific factors, 
it is imperative to utilize active control groups that permit such a 
rigorous comparison. The state of research in this area is still in 
its infancy, but as the field moves forward, it will be increasingly 
important to use rigorous comparison groups to which partici-
pants are randomly assigned. Of course, in studies of long-term 
practitioners, this is not possible, but these studies need to be sup-
plemented with longitudinal studies in less-experienced individuals 
where changes over time can be tracked (see below).
Next to choosing an appropriate control group, inclusion of a 
proper control task or task condition for which one does not expect 
to find meditation-related improvements, may also control for 
some of the above variables, in particular motivation and expect-
ancy effects. For instance, based upon theoretical models of the 
attentional blink, we predicted that 3 months of Vipassana medita-
tion, a form of OM meditation, (1) would selectively modulate later 
brain processes related to attentional resource allocation, but not 
early, sensory-driven brain processes (as indicated by early visual 
brain potential components), and (2) would only affect T2 process-
ing, not T1 processing, in trials in which T2 followed T1 within the 
time-window of the attentional blink (in short-interval, but not 
long-interval trials; Slagter et al., 2007; see above). As predicted, we 
only found meditation-related improvements in T2 performance 
in short-interval trials that were associated with selective changes 
in higher-order T2 processing. Such a theoretically founded, selec-
tive effect is difficult to explain in terms of, for example, a placebo 
effect. Yet, it should be noted that alternate explanations, such as 
changes in working memory capacity, mood, or arousal, cannot 
be fully excluded in this study. For example, behavioral studies 
have reported a relationship between working memory capacity 
Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996). This feature, as well as the active 
monitoring and regulation of arousal levels, may be an additional 
aspect of meditation regimens important for inducing process-
specific learning.
DURATION Of TRAINING
In most laboratory manipulations cognitive training typically is 
no longer than several weeks, and total training duration in most 
previous neuroimaging studies of cognitive task training amounted 
to less than 20 h, even in studies demonstrating transfer of learn-
ing (e.g., Dahlin et al., 2008). This duration of training might be 
too short to induce long-lasting process-specific learning. Indeed, 
the attainment of an expert level of performance requires about 
10,000  h of deliberate practice in the case of non-laboratory, 
domain-specific learning, such as performance of chess, surgery, 
music, and sports (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996). Because the tradi-
tional duration of training in meditation also involves many hours 
of intensive practice over years (Lutz et al., 2007), the study of long-
term meditators may provide a unique opportunity to investigate 
the development of process-specific learning. Reported differences 
in brain function between meditation experts (>10,000 h in life) vs. 
control subjects highlight the ability of meditation experts to gen-
erate new data that might not exist without such sustained mental 
training (Lutz et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2005; Brefczynski-Lewis 
et al., 2007). These data will need to be supplemented with data 
from studies that examine meditation-related changes over long 
time periods within the same individuals, from novice to expert. 
Such longitudinal data are necessary to exclude the possibility that 
observed training effects are due to pre-existing differences between 
groups (i.e., experts and novices) and will allow for a more precise 
delineation of the developmental trajectory of the trained abilities 
and the mechanisms that underlie process-specific learning. Thus, 
duration of training may represent a final determinant of process-
specific learning.
Meditation has both short-term, intermediate, and long-term 
effects. Many studies have reported changes in cognitive task per-
formance after relatively brief practice in the order of several days 
to weeks (e.g., Jha et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2007, 2010) or after 
a training period of several months (e.g., MacLean et al., 2010; 
Sahdra et al., in press). The extent to which these shorter-term 
changes are enduring and reflect lasting changes in brain function 
or structure is still unclear. Furthermore, the relationship between 
short- and long-term effects of meditation is at this point unknown, 
and longitudinal studies, that follow the same individual over 
time over longer time periods (i.e., years), are necessary to clarify 
this relationship.
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGEs
The problem of determining whether a treatment or intervention 
has an effect is ubiquitous in science, and the golden standard is 
to evaluate effects using randomized, double-blind experimental 
designs, in which participants are randomly assigned to either the 
experimental group or a control group, and neither the participants 
nor the experimenters know which group the participants are in. 
The neuroscientific study of meditation faces several methodo-
logical challenges in particular related to the fact that randomized 
assignment is not always possible, as in cross-sectional studies 
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mood and arousal and the size of the attentional blink (Olivers and 
Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Jeffries et al., 2008). It is thus possible that OM 
meditation in this study affected the size of the attentional blink by 
modulating one of these factors next to, or rather than by training 
attentional processes itself. This example illustrates the need for 
future research to determine the precise mechanisms that underlie 
effects of FA and OM meditation on cognitive phenomena, such 
as the attentional blink, and their underlying brain circuitry. This 
research would benefit from including questionnaires and/or tests 
that measure changes in, e.g., mood and working memory capacity, 
as well as psychophysiological measures of mood and arousal, such 
as skin conductance and heart rate variability, to shed further light 
on the precise mechanisms that may underlie observed effects, and 
to better control for possible confounding variables.
To summarize, since individuals cannot be blinded with respect 
to the fact that they are participating in a meditation study, control 
groups and tasks are essential for validating the effects of medita-
tion. Ideally, participants are randomly assigned to a practitioner 
and control group, and groups are matched in all aspects other 
than the factor of interest, most importantly in age, gender, race, 
socioeconomic status intelligence, motivation and study outcome 
expectancies. Questionnaires and psychophysiological measures 
may aid in interpreting observed effects of meditation.
CROss-sECTIONAL Vs. LONGITUDINAL sTUDIEs
There are two fundamental strategies for examining the effects of 
mental training, that each have distinct advantages and disadvan-
tages: cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches. In the cross-
sectional approach, individuals with varying levels of a given skill 
are compared and differences in some variables related to their 
skill level are identified. For example, neural function of long-term 
practitioners is compared with that of matched control subjects or 
less-experienced practitioners. This approach is useful for study-
ing mental training-related changes over longer time periods (e.g., 
many years), where the longitudinal study of individuals may be 
difficult. Yet, as randomized group assignment is not possible in this 
approach, cross-sectional designs may suffer from cohort effects, 
in which different groups (i.e., expert vs. novice meditators) differ 
from each other by factors of no-interest, for instance in sleep or 
nutritional habits, or with respect to pre-existing differences in per-
sonality characteristics. For example, although lower neuroticism 
scores are reported by QiGong meditators, who have practiced for 
a greater number of years (Leung and Singhal, 2004), meditation 
training is more likely to be discontinued by people with higher trait 
neuroticism (Delmonte and Kenny, 1985; Delmonte, 1988).
The longitudinal approach studies the same individual at every 
point. This approach therefore does not necessarily suffer from 
cohort effects, and provides optimal power to identify training-
related changes, because within-subject variability is typically 
smaller than across-subject variability. Yet, spending a number of 
months in a retreat environment, as is the case in many longitu-
dinal meditation studies, including some of the studies discussed 
above (Slagter et al., 2007, 2009; Lutz et al., 2009; MacLean et al., 
2010), also brings with it changes in for instance, sleep-wake cycle, 
mood, and arousal, and may require participants to practice in 
silence and with their eyes closed, depriving the senses of their 
usual stimulation. These confounding factors may well influence 
results. For example, it has been proposed that reduced sensory 
load does not only affect low-level sensory stimulus processing, for 
example, by increasing visual cortex excitability (e.g., Boroojerdi 
et al., 2000; Pitskel et al., 2007) or by modifying loudness percep-
tion (e.g., Formby et al., 2003; Munro and Blount, 2009), but can 
also lead to changes in higher-order cognitive information process-
ing (e.g., Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). Most meditation practices 
are performed either with defocused open eyes, defocused half-
open (hooded) eyes, or with closed eyes. It is possible that intensive 
meditation with defocused (half-) open eyes by reducing sensory 
load causes changes in the visual cortex similar to sensory depri-
vation. Notably, the longitudinal study by MacLean et al. (2010), 
discussed above, reported decreased visual perceptual threshold 
after 3 months of intensive meditation, and only found improved 
sustained attention task performance when retreat participants 
were allowed to use their pre-retreat visual stimuli. Improvements 
in sustained attention were not observed when perceptual thresh-
olds were individually adjusted post-retreat to match each partici-
pant’s pre-retreat perceptual threshold in difficulty. In this study, 
meditation-related reductions in sensory load may thus in part 
explain the observed changes in attentional function. The con-
found of reduced sensory load during some meditative practices 
is one that needs to be addressed in future studies. Neuroimaging 
measures may also be useful in this respect. For example, in the 
aforementioned Slagter et al. (2007) study, meditation was not 
associated with changes in early sensory processing (as indexed by 
the early visual brain potential components P1 and N1), suggesting 
that reduced sensory load likely did not contribute to the observed 
meditation-related changes in higher-order target processing in 
this study.
To summarize, meditation researchers should be circumspect 
of possible confounds related to the fact that individuals cannot be 
blinded to the meditation intervention, confounds that are asso-
ciated with using cross-sectional and longitudinal study designs, 
and caveats, such as sensory deprivation or changes in sleep-wake 
cycle, that are more specific to the study of meditation. The above 
emphasizes the importance of conducting single-blind meditation 
studies. Those involved in data collection and analysis should be 
blinded with regard to group assignment and/or the specific study 
predictions to prevent experimenter biases (the favoring of certain 
outcomes over others) from influencing results. Of course, this is 
not possible in all cases, for example, when participants are studied 
in retreat settings.
It should be emphasized that many of the above challenges are 
not unique to the study of meditation. For example, one should 
always insure that effects of cognitive training cannot be explained 
by differences in motivation, arousal, mood, or expectancy bias 
between training and control groups, or by pre-existing differ-
ences between groups in age, intelligence, etc. Thus, in general, any 
cognitive training study should be designed with a clear concep-
tion of the research question and the hypothesized mechanism, 
and thorough consideration of how threats to validity may be 
best addressed for a given, clearly defined training procedure. 
Nevertheless, the development of adequate comparison groups 
against which to compare mental training as cultivated by medita-
tion remains an important avenue for future research. Only when 
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learning and transfer of learning, and many of them have previously 
been suggested to account for the more general learning observed 
after action video gaming, musical training, and athletic training 
(Green and Bavelier, 2008; Hillman et al., 2008). Like meditation, 
these more “natural” training regimens are exceedingly complex, 
tap many systems in parallel, and include variability in task and 
input (Green and Bavelier, 2008). Challenging and variable training 
thus appears important for inducing flexible learning that more 
easily generalizes to novel stimuli and task contexts. A key difference 
between meditation and these natural training regimens is that 
many meditation practices are explicitly designed to target specific, 
well-defined core cognitive processes. This too may contribute to 
the ability of mental training as cultivated by meditation to induce 
process-specific learning.
Future research should examine which specific aspects of a 
particular style of meditation actually produce changes in brain 
and cognitive function. As mentioned above, both FA and OM 
meditation tap several cognitive processes in parallel. It remains 
to be determined which mental training-related changes in cog-
nitive processing actually produce, e.g., the observed differences 
in attention and brain function reported by some of the studies 
reviewed above. Future research should also be directed toward 
investigating the unique challenges that the studies on meditation 
practices present in designing appropriate controls. In addition, 
more research should be done on the “dose response” of meditation 
practices to determine what may be effective study durations and 
to help standardize training interventions.
While the neuroscientific study of meditation is still in its infancy, 
mainstream psychology and cognitive neuroscience will arguably 
be well served by engaging in a more open, but nonetheless critical 
and rigorous, examination of the findings from meditation studies. 
Such findings may help to determine the extent to which the adult 
brain is plastic or subject to change, identify the basic mechanisms 
that underlie process-specific learning, and could lead to further 
exploration of cognitive-neural systems that are resilient to damage, 
amenable to reorganization, and capable of improving efficiency of 
processing through training or pharmacological treatment.
done in a scientifically rigorous way can the study of meditation 
advance our understanding of the plasticity of cognitive processes 
and their underlying neural circuitry.
DIsCUssION AND CONCLUsION
In this paper, we have reviewed the rationale for using mental train-
ing to study brain and cognitive plasticity. We have illustrated how 
the application of meditation in conjunction with neuroimaging 
methods has been used to shed light on the amenability of cognitive 
functions and their underlying brain circuitry to training. We have 
also identified several factors that may determine process-specific 
learning from the vantage point of mental training as cultivated 
by meditation, and discussed methodological challenges that the 
study of meditation needs to address. While the neuroscientific 
study of meditation is clearly still in its infancy, the initial findings 
reviewed here promise both to reveal the mechanisms by which 
such training may exert its effects and underscore the plasticity of 
the brain circuits that underlie complex mental functions. More 
generally, these findings support the idea that the nervous system is 
a continuously changing structure of which plasticity is an integral 
property and the obligatory consequence of not only sensory and 
motor processing, but also of more complex mental activities, such 
as focusing attention and meta-cognitive monitoring (Buonomano 
and Merzenich, 1998; Pascual-Leone et al., 2005). Just as a specific 
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